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This article shows that the inflow of capital does not contribute to growth and tests the 
hypothesis that countries with trade balance deficits need to set high interest rates to attract 
capital flows. In a series of papers, A. Shaikh has put forth this hypothesis based on Marx, 
classical economists, and post-Keynesians such as Harrod. In order to test our hypothesis, we 
take Mexico as a case study using data between 1950 and 2014. To test our hypothesis, that 
countries with trade balance deficits need to set high interest rates to attract capital flows, we 
(1) show that foreign direct investment (FDI) does not have any impact on investment and 
growth, and (2) use econometric techniques such as cointegration and a vector error correction 
model (VECM). 
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BALANZA COMERCIAL, FLUJO DE CAPITAL Y TIPO DE INTERÉS REAL EN 
MÉXICO DESDE 1950 A 2014. 
 
 
Resumen 
 
Este artículo muestra que la afluencia de capital no contribuye al crecimiento y pone a prueba 
la hipótesis de que los países con déficit de la balanza comercial deben fijar altas tasas de 
interés para atraer flujos de capital. En una serie de artículos, A. Shaikh ha presentado esta 
hipótesis basada en Marx, los economistas clásicos y post-keynesianos como Harrod. Para 
probar nuestra hipótesis, tomamos a México como un estudio de caso usando datos entre 1950 
y 2014. Para probar nuestra hipótesis, que los países con déficit de la balanza comercial 
necesitan fijar altas tasas de interés para atraer flujos de capital, (1) (IED) no tiene ningún 
impacto en la inversión y el crecimiento, y (2) utiliza técnicas econométricas como la 
cointegración y un modelo de corrección de errores vectoriales (VECM). 
Palabras clave: Flujo de Capital, Tasa de Interés, Déficit Comercial y México. 
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1. Introduction 
       The growth rate in Mexico has been as high as 6.3 percent in a period of scarce capital 
movements such as import substitution (1933-1981). In turn, during a period of financial 
liberalization such as neoliberalism (1982-present day), the growth rate has been as low as 2.2 
percent. Neoclassical economists consider that, except in special cases, capital flows contribute 
positively to growth and development (Grabel 2003). In contrast to this point of view, the 
objective of this paper is to show that capital flows do not contribute to economic growth. 
Specifically, we argue that countries with trade surpluses become capital exporters and will 
have a low interest rate. Conversely, deficit countries need to attract short-term capital such that 
the interest rate is then higher than in countries that are experiencing a trade surplus. This 
hypothesis is expressed in Shaikh (1980, 1999, 2007, and 2016) following the ideas of classical 
economists, Marx, and post-Keynesian economists such as Harrod (1963 and 1969). In order 
to test our hypothesis, we take Mexico as a case study using data between 1950 and 2014. We 
use econometric techniques such as cointegration (Johansen-Juselius) and a vector error 
correction model (VECM) to show that trade balance in Mexico precedes the Mexican real 
interest rate free of risk. 
This article is divided into five sections. Section 2 describes the relationship between 
capital flows and economic growth, accounted by some schools of economic thought. We then 
specify the position to be taken in this article. In Section 3, we demonstrate that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) was not related to Mexico's economic growth during the 1950-2014 period, 
and in Section 4, we prove that there is causality between the trade balance and the interest rate 
using cointegration (Johansen-Juselius) and a VECM. Finally, we present the conclusions in 
section 5. 
 
2. Capital Flows and Economic Growth 
For the neoclassical school, the differential between private investment and private savings 
makes necessary the inflow of capital. Thus, capital inflow can positively affect growth and 
development (Williamson 1990; Kokko 1994; Love and Lage-Hidalgo 2000; Ramírez 2000; 
Dussel Peters et al., 2007). Exceptional conditions where this relationship does not apply are 
loans to increase government spending because they increase inflation, and flows of short-term 
capital because they can lead to macroeconomic problems such as a banking crisis and/or 
depreciations. Then, to address these conditions, fiscal discipline must be maintained along 
with adequate regulation of the financial system (Mohsin and Mathieson 1996; Carstens and 
Schawartz 1998; Ramirez 2000; Cárdenas Sánchez 2015). 
Within the heterodox tradition, capital flows do not have such positive effects on growth 
and development. For some theories such as development economics, structuralism, and the 
bulk of post-Keynesian theories, capital flows may have positive and negative effects on growth 
and development conditional to the institutional framework. On the other hand, for other 
theories such as several Marxian strands and post-Keynesian perspectives (such as those of 
Harrod (1963, 1969)) and Kregel (2006, 2008), capital flows have a negative effect. In this 
section, we first describe schools of thought that consider that capital flows may have mixed 
effects, and subsequently, we describe other schools of thought that there are instead.     
Development economists have considered that foreign capital via external debt and FDI 
could complement domestic savings in developing countries if exceptional conditions hold 
(Lewis 1955; Nurkse 1955; Cypher 1997). For example, for Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), to 
increase the levels of national investment, external debt should consist of long-term loans (20 
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years) and soft loans (90 years) with wide grace periods (20 years). Given these conditions, in 
the long-term countries may ignite a process of self-financing. 
For structuralism, which is the Latin American school of thought, if capital flows increase 
the level of investment in developing countries, capital may positively affect growth. However, 
structuralists have noted that for Latin American countries, the burden of debt service and the 
remittance of profits and dividends to home countries have been higher than the initial flow of 
capital. Also, structuralists have pointed out that capital flows do not contribute to make 
countries more productive since exports are not encouraged (see Prebish 1970).  Paz (1978) has 
argued that capital flows cover trade deficits, which are provoked by the deterioration of the 
terms trade.  Meanwhile, the deterioration of the terms of trade has been explained by the 
specialization of the peripheral countries in primary products (with low productivity) and the 
existence of certain institutions such as monopolies. 
For post-Keynesian authors such as Kalecki (1980), external debt and FDI can contribute 
positively to growth if investment in producing capital goods as well as essential consumption 
goods rises. In the same sense, for Kalecki, the inflow of capital contributes to growth if the 
consumption of essential goods increases. However, according to Kalecki (1980), debt and FDI 
in developing countries instead have been used to solve balance of payments problems in fixed 
exchange rate regimes. 
Views such as development economics consider that good international as well as national 
conditions may hold in the long run, but such views do not take into account the dynamics of 
capitalism, and that in world economic expansions, such as the golden years of capitalism 
(1945-1973),2 interest rates can remain low, but achieving growth during long-term recession 
is quite different. In the case of structuralism, if capital flows are framed in good government 
policies and some institutions are removed, the inflow of capital can make a positive 
contribution to development. In the long run, countries can leave the periphery and become 
core countries (Prebish 1970; Rodriguez 2006). This last conclusion has been criticized by 
adherents of the dependency school, because they believe that structuralism does not take into 
account the problems of unequal exchange.3 Finally, in the case of post-post-Keynesians such 
as Kalecki, for capital flows to have an impact on growth, concerted state planning has to be 
carried out, which would be forced by empowering the working classes. However, this last 
stage has not been achieved in developing countries. 
Within the Marxist tradition, schools of economic thought point out that the effects of 
capital flows can be positive or negative, but the latter are the most important and we proceed 
to discuss them. According to Szymanski (1974), Marx pointed out three phases with respect 
to the direction of capital flows: (1) exploitation via plunder from the 16th to 18th centuries; (2) 
exploitation via international trade in the early 19th century. During that period, developing 
countries purchased means of consumption from developed countries (capital went from the 
south to the north); and (3) the era of industrial investment, from the late 19th century to the 
present day (during which capital has moved from north to south). In this last phase, capital 
moves freely across the world, searching for higher profits; developed countries will export 
capital and accumulation will rise in developing countries. The long-run effect is that 
developing countries become more industrialized and productive.  
                                                     
2 The period of global high growth rates, generally considered to be 1945 to 1973 and called the golden age of 
capitalism, was characterized by low capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar. 
3 Unequal exchange means that developing countries are losers in international trade because developing countries 
have less productivity or lower wages than advanced countries. Then, for the dependency school, there is no 
convergence among countries in the long run through international trade (see Kay1989).  
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However, two Marxist visions (the dependency school and the school of the Monthly 
Review, MR) pointed out by Szymanski (1974), and another Marxist view elaborated later (see 
Shaikh 1980, 1999, 2007, 2016), question the result that capital flows contribute to increased 
industry and productivity of developing countries: 
1. For the dependency school, because developing countries cannot retain their surplus 
values produced and have to send the surplus to developed countries, the effect of 
capital flows on growth and development is always negative (Baran 1952, 1957; 
Frank 1972; Kay 1989). 
2. For the authors of MR, capital mobility, increased productivity, and industrialization 
of developing countries characterized 19th century competitive capitalism but not the 
monopoly capitalism of the 20th. According to Sweezy and Magdoff (1971; see also 
Sweezy 1970), the monopoly does not permit free mobility of capital and the search 
for higher profits. Markets are then not perfect and there are barriers to entry. On one 
hand, there are monopolized industrial branches with high profitability; and, on the 
other hand, there are plenty of industrial branches with low profitability. Monopolies 
thus do not increase their investments in productive activities, and instead put their 
surpluses in unproductive activities such as finance. 
3. Finally, Shaikh (1980, 1999, 2007, and 2016) argues that with free trade and capital 
mobility, the least productive countries will undergo trade deficits, low real wages, 
and increased unemployment and poverty. For Shaikh (2007, 2016), the main 
characteristic of capitalism is competition, which is defined as the ability of firms to 
gain and hold the world market’s share via cost reduction (Shaikh 2007). Then, 
international trade is determined by productivity and real wages. Less productive 
countries with higher profit rates will experience deterioration of the terms of trade, 
and subsequently, a trade balance deficit. For this reason, unproductive countries 
need inflows of capital (Shaikh 2007, 56 and 57): 
“The alternative argument, which I will call the classical theory of “competitive 
advantage”, rejects the standard theory altogether. In brief, the argument here is that relative 
prices of international goods, and hence nation’s terms of trade, are regulated in the same way 
as relative national prices. In both cases, high cost producers lose out to low-cost ones, and 
high-cost regions (nations) tend to suffer trade deficits, which tend to be covered by 
corresponding capital inflows (subsidies and borrowing)”  
According to Harrod (1963 and 1969), countries with surpluses will have a low interest 
rate. Investment may rise, which causes an economic expansion; and income as well as 
consumption and imports rise. Developed countries’ capital may go to deficit countries with an 
interest rate higher than that in the developed countries. Meanwhile, deficit countries will have 
a high interest rate. Investment may decline, thereby causing a recession, and income as well 
as consumption and imports decline. With this mechanism, external balance can be achieved 
but problems such as unemployment and inflation may remain. In addition, the inflow of capital 
does not contribute to the growth of the countries because (1) capital covers only the trade 
deficit (here, capital is not autonomous searching for profitable opportunities), and (2) 
cooperation is needed among surplus countries and deficit countries to solve the problems of 
growth, inflation, and unemployment (see Harrod 1963 and 1969). 
Recently, other authors such as Kregel (2006; 2008) have reported that capital flows do not 
have a positive effect on the economic growth of developing countries. However, Kregel points 
out that the direction of the causality is from capital flows to the trade balance. Kregel, unlike, 
Shaikh, takes into account not only short-term capital but also what is considered long-term 
capital, mostly FDI. In this article, we separate long-term capital from short-term capital. In the 
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next section, we proceed to an examination of FDI contributions to economic growth, 
investment, and capital outflows. We then prove the causality between the rate of interest and 
the trade balance.  This relationship is tested for the case of Mexico from 1950 to 2014. 
 
3. Economic Growth, Investment, FDI, and Net Transfer of Resources 
Three models of accumulation have been applied since Mexican independence (1821):4 the 
primary-export model, the import-substitution model, and neoliberalism. Even though these 
models of accumulation were processes and cannot be dated with accuracy, in this article, we 
assert that the primary-export model ended in 1933 and gave way to the import-substitution 
model, which lasted until 1981. Then, from 1982 to the present day, the neoliberal model has 
characterized Mexican economy. Our selection criterion for these periods was based on the 
performance of key variables such as GDP and investment, among others, and on the 
establishment of certain institutions such as development banks to achieve growth. 5  For 
example, Figure 1 plots the growth rate of the Mexican GDP and investment rate. From 1933 
to 1981, the growth rate average was 6.3 percent per year; the investment rate grew from 5 
percent in 1933 to 25 percent in 1981. For these reasons, during the import-substitution model 
there was technical change and convergence with respect to the US (Mariña 2011; Romero 
2012; Isidro Luna 2014). In addition to the improvement of the productive sector, the Mexican 
entrepreneurs grew and established a financial sector that operated with close ties among private 
banks, Banco de México, and state-owned development banks (de Mobarak 2006, 2010, 
Garrido 2002, 2004, 2005, Amsden 2001, Mariña 2011, Isidro Luna 2014). 
During neoliberalism, improving variables during the import-substitution model have 
suffered reversals. For example, the growth rate averaged around 2.2 percent from 1982 
onward, technical change slowed down (Romero 2012), and severe crises more frequently beset 
the country. In addition, many institutions built to capture technical progress such as 
development banks and state-owned enterprises were dismantled or radically altered their 
functions (Villareal 1983; Guillén Romo 1996, 2005; Mattar et al. 2002; Sosa Barajas 2008; 
Mariña 2011; Isidro Luna 2014). 
  
                                                     
4 From 1810 to 1821, Mexico waged a war for its independence, following three economic periods can be 
distinguished before the establishment of the import-substitution model: (1) the period 1821 to 1876 was 
characterized by political instability and external debt problems; (2) the 1876 to 1910 period saw political stability, 
economic growth, and increasing economic and social inequality;  and (3) 1910 to 1933 experienced political 
instability and debt problems, but also the consolidation of the Mexican national-state (Isidro Luna 2015). 
5 Several institutions helped to maintain economic growth in Mexico during the import-substitution period: (1) 
development banks provided credit and equity to industrial companies, (2) universities were created to provide 
qualify workers to industrial branches, (3) official labor unions guaranteed an adequate and no problematic labor 
force, and (4) an incipient national security system was created to protect workers in the industrial areas.  
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Figure 1. Growth rate of Mexican real GDP (left axis) and investment rate (right axis) 
 
Source: INEGI (2006) and MOxLAD (2016) 
 
However, the import-substitution model was a period of low capital mobility; conversely, 
the neoliberal model has been a period of high capital mobility. We mentioned that the inflow 
of capital is provoked by trade deficits. In this sense, the inflow of capital barely has an impact 
on growth and development. However, this argument is valid for short-term capital.  
What about FDI? Has FDI sparked growth in Mexico? Historically, FDI has scarcely 
sparked growth and development in Mexico. First of all, in import substitution (Bulmer-
Thomas 1994) as well as in neoliberalism, the inflow of capital via FDI has been scarce. The 
ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) was 4.3 percent from 1950 to 1981, and 
the ratio of FDI to GDP was 0.77 percent (CEPAL 2016a). These amounts did not increase 
much during the neoliberal era; the ratio of FDI to GFCF was 8.5 percent, and the ratio FDI to 
GDP was 1.7 percent (see Figure 2) (CEPAL 2016b). This amount of resources was low even 
for conservative authors such as O'Rourke (2001), who considers that there were higher inflows 
of capital before WWII than after.  O'Rourke (2001) points out that by the end of the 19th 
century, the percentage of FDI with respect to investment reached levels of 75 percent in 
Mexico. 
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Figure 2. FDI as a percent of GFCF (left axis) and FDI as percent of GDP (right axis) 
 
Source: CEPAL (2016a) and CEPAL (2016b) 
 
Even though FDI has come to Mexico in scarce amounts, it may be argued that FDI may 
have made a great contribution to growth because it: 
1. Increased productivity and technology transfers (Kokko 1994; Ramírez 2000; Dussel 
Peters et al., 2007), 
2. Enhanced the size of the volume of employment, and 
3. Increased the size of the national capital stock (Ramirez 2000). 
However, there is not agreement among scholars if these assertions hold. First of all, 
Romero (2011) and Mattar et al. (2002) have reported that productivity in Mexico during the 
neoliberal era has decreased and not the opposite. Also, Romero (2011) points out that 
technological spillovers have not been present in the Mexican economy. Second, according to 
Romero (2011), FDI does not hire high skilled workers and, as Mendoza Cota (2012) has 
shown, through a dynamic panel data model, the FDI has had little effect on manufacturing 
employment during the 2000s. Finally, even though several authors, including Ramirez (2000), 
have shown the positive role of FDI in the Mexican economy increasing the capital stock, its 
analysis was carried out during the 1990s. Subsequent studies have shown that there was a 
boom in FDI investment at the end of the 1990s, but the same variable declined afterward 
(Mattar et al. 2002; Romero 2011).  
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Mexican investment may increase if in the long-run foreign companies’ profits are 
reinvested; however, this argument is conditional on the fact that capital does not leave the 
country via profits remittances to home countries (see Prebish 1970; Harrod 1969; Ramirez 
2006). Figure 3 plots net interest payments, net investment income, and the net resources 
transfer (NRT), which consists of the inflow of capital minus the balance of income of the 
current account (mostly net interest payments and net investment income).  As observed, NRT 
was positive during import substitution, but it barely reached 2 percent of GDP. During 
neoliberalism, NTR has been negative for many years and has undergone strong fluctuations. 
Markedly, from 1982 onward negative net investment income has been growing in Mexico, and 
FDI’s contribution to growth has been minimal. If remittances to home countries were 
discounted to FDI, the contribution of this last variable to the Mexican investment would be 
near 1 percent on average from 1982 to 2014 (calculations based on CEPAL 2016B).  
Other authors have shown that positive impacts from FDI to growth are difficult to find in 
developing countries (see Chakraborty 2008; Herzer et al. 2008). 
 
Figure 3. Net Interest Payment, Net Investment Income, and NRT 
 
Source: CEPAL (2016a) and CEPAL (2016b) 
Finally, neither short-term nor long-term capital contributes to growth because inflow of 
capital is not autonomous: both forms of capital are correlated with the trade balance for Mexico 
from 1950 to 2014. The correlation between trade balance and total capital inflow is - 67 
percent. Figure 4 neatly demonstrates that trade balance and total inflow of capital move 
together in opposite directions. 
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Figure 4. Total Inflow of Capital (Percent of GDP) and Trade Balance (Percent of GDP) 
 
Source: CEPAL (2016a) and CEPAL (2016b) 
 
4. Empirical Relationship Between Trade Balance and Real Interest Rate 
 
In this section we will prove that there is a negative relationship between trade balance and 
the real interest rate in Mexico from the period 1950 to 2014. We will then assert that deficit 
countries have a higher interest rate than surplus countries. Subsequently, capital inflow is 
required to solve problems in trade balance. Trade balance series were obtained from CEPAL’s 
statistical notebooks (2006a) for 1950 to 1980, and for 1981 onward they were obtained from 
CEPAL’S statistical yearbook (2006b). We then divided trade balance series by current GDP. 
Meanwhile, the annual nominal interest free of risk was obtained from Villalpando-Benitez 
(2000) for 1950 to 1977, and from the database FRED Economic Data of Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis (2016) for 1978 onward. For this period, CETES’ nominal interest rate was used. 
Subsequently, to obtain the real interest rate, we take the nominal interest rate minus the 
inflation rate.  
Figure 5 shows the two variables mentioned above; except for the first years of the 1950s, 
the two series move in the opposite direction. Also, it is clear that during the stabilizing 
development (around 1958 to 1970), to match the objectives of high growth, fixed exchange 
rate, and low inflation, a constant inflow of capital through a high interest rate was needed 
(Green, 1976; Reynolds, 1977; Ortiz 1998). 
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Figure 5. Trade balance as percent of GDP (left axis) and real interest rate (right axis) 
 
Source: CEPAL (2016a, 2016b), Villalpando-Benitez (2000), and St. Louis Reserve (2016) 
  
In Figure 6 it can be observed that both the trade balance and the real interest rate are 
negatively correlated. The correlation coefficient is -52 percent. However, the presence of 
outliers is clear, as is the case in the transition from Miguel de la Madrid to Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (1988-1989) and the 1995 crisis. If these two years are left out, the correlation rises to 
-59 percent. 
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Figure 6. Scatter Plot Between Trade Balance as a Percent of GDP and the Real Interest Rate 
from 1950 to 2014 
 
Source: CEPAL (2016a, 2016b), Villalpando-Benitez (2000), and St. Louis Reserve (2016) 
 
Once we see that the two variables are correlated, we test if one of them precedes the other 
and if one of them can be used as a predictor of the other. In so doing, we carry out a vector 
error correction model, which is specified as follows: 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 + ∑𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼0𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1+ε𝑡𝑡 
r holds for interest rate and tb for trade balance. ECT is the error-correction term, ε is a 
random error term, α0 shows the long-term relationship between the two variables, φri and φtbi 
are the parameters that show the short-term relationship. Carrying out the model, we take the 
following steps: (1) First of all, we revise the two series to not be stationary at levels, but their 
first difference is stationary; (2) we obtain the adequate lag through model selection criteria 
(Akaike and Schwarz); (3) we test if the two series cointegrate according to the Johansen-
Juselius procedure and (4) we run a VECM. We proceed to expand the steps mentioned before. 
First, Table 1 shows that the yearly Mexican trade balance and real interest rate are a 
nonstationary process. Following the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) for the case of the 
interest rate, and the ADF and Phillips-Perron Test for trade balance, we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses of the existence of unit roots in the two series. However, the first difference of both 
series (Δr and ΔTB) is stationary, and therefore the series are I (1). 
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Table 1. Order of Integration of Trade Balance (TB) and Real Interest Rate (r) 
  ADF   PP    KPSS 
Variable A B  A  B  ημ ητ 
r  -2.29 -2.32  -5.79*  -5.81*  0.14 0.14 
Δr  -7.86*  -7.92*  -13.71* -14.84* 0.054 0.054 
ΔΔr  -11.41*-11.52* -20.40 * -24.72* 0.045 0.043 
TB  -2.95  -2.81  -3.00  -2.99*  0.15 0.099 
ΔTB  -4.39*  -4.44*  -8.43*  -8.53*  0.038 0.033 
ΔΔTB  -6.28*  -6.34*  -22.26* -22.47* 0.035 0.035 
Δ indicates first difference 
Model A adds constant and trend, and model B adds only constant. 
ημ and ητ indicate the KPSS test, where the null hypothesis is that the series are stationary. 
* Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
Conclusions: series are I(1). 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on R 3.3. 
Second, once we know that the series have the same level of integration, we proceed to see 
if there is a long-term relationship via Johansen-Juselius cointegration (we use three lags). The 
null hypotheses of one cointegranting vector is accepted (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Johansen-Juselius Procedure, ir and bc, and Trace 
Cointegrating Vector test 5pct 
r <= 1* 7.8 9.24 
r = 0 29.41 17.85 
*We accept the null hypothesis that states there is one cointegrating vector. Three lags. 
 
Finally, we can conclude that there is a long-term relationship between r and the tb because 
the error correction term (ECT) is negative and significant, which indicates a long-run causality 
running from tb to r. The speed of adjustment to equilibrium after one year is nearly 55 percent, 
so in spite of fluctuations, the series go to equilibrium after some years. Even though the 
majority of the individual coefficients are not significant, there is also a short-term relationship 
between r and tb because lags of the variables are globally significant (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: VECM Results 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value  p-value 
Constant 0.3384  1.0127   0.334  0.7396 
ECT  -0.5474 0.2072   -2.641  0.0108 
Δrt-1  -0.1114 0.1856   -0.600  0.5509 
Δrt-2  0.2665  0.1415   -1.883  0.0652 
Δrt-3  -0.1745 0.1138   -1.534  0.1310 
Δtbt-1  -2.1831 0.7231   -3.019  0.0039 
Δtbt-2  1.8971  0.7396   2.565  0.0132 
Δtbt-3  0.7394  0.7630   0.969  0.3369 
Multiple R-squared:   0.67, Adjusted R-squared:  0.6264, Durbin-Watson (DW) = 2.076, p-value = 0.5903, 
Jarque Bera Test p-value 0.293, Goldfeld-Quandt test p-value 0.5995, Breusch-Godfrey test, p-value = 0.105, F-
statistic: 15.37 on 7 and 53 DF, p-value: 8.531e-1. R package 3.3 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main objectives of this paper were to show that the inflows of capital do not contribute 
to growth and that the trade balance precedes the real interest rate for the Mexican case from 
1950 to 2014. Then, the trade balance deficit makes necessary the inflow of capital, as was 
established by Marx, classical economists, and some post-Keynesian economists such as 
Harrod. To prove our objective, we carried out the following: (1) an exploration of the 
relationship between capital flows and economic growth according to several schools of 
economic thought; (2) a demonstration that FDI does not have any significant effect on 
investment and growth after WWII (FDI was low under the import-substitution model as well 
in neoliberalism-- also, after discounting the remittances to home countries, its investment 
contribution to the capital stock is minimal); and (3) a proof that trade balance causes the real 
interest rate via an VECM: the speed of adjustment in the long run was almost 55 percent. 
Our finding is in line with Shaikh’s analysis, which indicates that real variables drive 
financial variables in the long run. Also, our findings may be the basis for other investigations 
exploring the relationship between real and financial variables in the long run. However, our 
article presents the following limitations: (1) some developing countries may have a trade 
surplus and a high interest rate as in the case of China (as has been stated in this paper, some 
countries may set the interest rate according to their objectives of inflation, unemployment, and 
growth); (2) more accurate data on the Mexican interest rate has to be compiled in the future, 
and the series we used is only a proxy of the Mexican interest rate; (3) other variables such as 
the exchange rate have to be incorporated in subsequent models (Hernandez-Martinez 2015); 
and (4) new statistics exercises have to be carried out to test if in the future capital flows can 
cause the movements of the trade balance, as has been singled out by Kregel (2006, 2008). 
Despite the limitations we have discussed, we do point out at least one lesson. During the 
1980s and the 1990s, Mexico had a great external debt burden. The country had to sell off assets 
and carry out debt conversion programs in exchange for FDI. If Mexico is not more productive 
in the current economic climate, the country will have to attract capital, and again may be forced 
to sell off assets or reduce social spending. 
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